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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of non-price competition on bank performance in the 
Ukrainian banking industry from 2009 Q1 to 2015 Q4. The competition is proxied by three 
measures of multimarket contacts. Our data reveal that banks with higher level of multiple 
market contacts are more likely to be profitable. The findings support the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis. When banks compete with rivals that are similar in size in multiple markets, they 
have incentives to cooperate instead of competing aggressively. Moreover, the effect is 
stronger when multimarket competitors are highly similar in size and interact in more 
competitive markets. Furthermore, we develop an identification strategy in which military 
actions are treated as an exogenous shock to banks with branches in those regions. The results 
suggest that after the conflict, the less affected banks do not have incentives to mutual forbear 
with more affected banks that experienced a sharper decline in number of branches. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, the structure of banking systems has changed dramatically because of 
deregulation and international branch expansion. As the number of geographically diversified 
banks has increased, the number of markets in which banks coincide has also increased.  
There is some concern whether banks could improve their financial performance through 
geographic overlaps. On one hand, banks’ regional diversification could improve 
performance. On the other hand, a decision of entering market could be doubtful because of 
the effects competition. The trade-offs are even more complicated when we consider the 
multimarket setup. Thus there is a growing literature examining how repeated competition 
affects firm performance in all sectors of the economy generally and in banking system 
particularly. 
There are two different theoretical views about the impact of multimarket contacts on 
competition and profitability. The mutual forbearance hypothesis suggests that firms with a 
high degree of multimarket contact are more profitable because these firms tend to operate in 
collusion with each other instead of competing aggressively (e.g., Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 
1984; Spagnolo, 1999). However, multimarket contacts may enhance the intensity of 
competition and lead to a further reduction in profitability (e.g., Solomon, 1970; Mester, 
1992). The empirical literature in the banking sector provides mixed and inconclusive 
findings. Several studies argue that a multimarket contact is positively related to banks’ 
profitability (e.g, Whalen, 1996; Pilloff, 1999; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2009), while other 
papers (e.g., Rhoades and Heggestad, 1985; De Bonis and Ferrando, 2000) provide limited 
support for the mutual forbearance nexus. Moreover, Mester (1987) shows that the cross-
product between market concentration and contact is more important than the individual 
effects.  
Here, we investigate the relationship between non-price competition as measured by multiple 
geographic overlaps and bank financial performance of Ukrainian banks. Our unique dataset 
has financial and branch information for 209 Ukrainian banks from 2009 Q1 to 2015 Q4. We 
define competition on the basis of various weighting factors to account for the change in 
competitive attitude towards different markets and rivals. Given the magnitude of the current 
political conflict between Ukraine and Russia, we make use of it as a quasi-experiment. 
Specifically, we employ the differences-in-differences (DID) approach with fixed effects 
regressions.  
The Ukrainian banking system is a well-suited case for several reasons. First, the Ukrainian 
banking system is well diversified in terms of banks’ size i.e. large and small banks, and the 
intensity of competitive interaction i.e. multimarket and single-market banks. It is quite 
interesting that some smaller banks experience higher levels of multimarket contact in 
comparison with bigger banks. Second, the banking system in the Ukraine has changed 
dramatically since 1991—after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Law 
on Banks and Banking. From 1991 to 2014, the banking system developed in terms of the 
number of banks as well as its role in the economy. However, Ukraine’s banking system has 
been on the brink of collapse since 2014 because of the significant drop in the number of 
banks as well as their massive losses. Furthermore, there is a political dispute between 
Ukraine and Russia starting in 2014 Q1—this might have had a huge impact on Ukraine’s 
banking system. Therefore it is worth assessing how multimarket competition plays a role in 
the banking system during the period of the notable branch and geographic expansion by 
taking advantage of this quasi-experimental setting.  
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Our first set of results shows a positive and significant relationship between repeated 
competition and banks’ profitability. The relationship is stronger when banks’ sizes are 
relatively similar and when banks overlap in more competitive markets. However, banks do 
not benefit from geographic overlaps with the multimarket competitors with significant 
different sizes. Our results are robust to the use of alternative variables of multimarket 
competition and different sets of samples. The differences-in-differences approach provides a 
good method to address endogeneity: an insight into the competitive attitude of banks that 
have responded to changes in the markets. As a consequence of the conflict, more affected 
banks have closed many of their branches. This decreases the banks’ size and reduces the 
competitiveness of the banking system. Thus, after the conflict, less affected banks do not 
have incentives to co-operate with more affected ones. 
This study provides empirical evidence for the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the banking 
sector and contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, our unique and rich data 
allow us to define multimarket competition at different geographical levels. More specifically, 
we measured competition at the regional level and at the city level1. Second, we use different 
weighting factors to measure multimarket contact, to account for the size similarity of the two 
rival banks as well as the ratio of the coincided markets and the relative size of competitors. 
These measures account for the different attitudes of a bank towards its multipoint rivals 
depending on the importance of their rivals. Third, we address the potential obstacles relating 
to the causal inference by employing a differences-in-differences method. More specifically, 
we document the multimarket competition-performance relationship in the presence of the 
current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Fourth, this study provides micro economic 
evidence for the link between multimarket contacts and profitability in the context of 
developing countries.  
Our findings have several implications in policy making. First, consolidation of small and 
medium banks should be encouraged. Hence, the consolidated banks can improve their 
competitive positions and gain benefits from anti-competitive effect of multimarket contacts. 
Second, regulators should encourage banks to operate new branches in remote or less 
competitive markets. This brings benefits not only to customers in terms of access to finance 
but also to banks because banks can get more benefits from repeated competition in more 
competitive markets.  
The next section reviews the literature on multimarket competition. Section 3 provides the 
overview about the Ukrainian banking system. Section 4 illustrates our empirical strategy and 
data description. Section 5 presents empirical results and discussion. Section 6 concludes and 
provides the policy implications.  
                                                 
1 Empirical studies about multimarket competition-profitability relationship with reference to banking sector are 
facing several challenges. The first challenge is about data requirement. To be able to measure multimarket 
competition, the detailed data about branch address of each bank are required. The second challenge arises from 
the problem of omitted variable bias: the relationship between banks’ competitive behavior and performance 
might be mediated by other unobserved bank characteristics. Therefore, regressing profitability on multimarket 
competition in the absence of experimental experience might fail to identify the causal relationship. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Mutual forbearance hypothesis  
Issues related to multimarket contacts have been examined both theoretically and empirically 
over the past few decades. In terms of theoretical frameworks, the traditional phenomenon, 
referred to as linked oligopoly theory or mutual forbearance hypothesis, was first proposed by 
Edwards (1955). This suggests that a large and diversified firm may not have aggressive 
attitudes toward their multimarket competitors due to the fear of multipoint attacks from those 
rivals. In contrast, multimarket firms might have incentive to cooperate with others in the 
hope of a reciprocal exchange of favors. Consequently, the multimarket firms could be more 
profitable versus smaller firms due to anti-competitive effects along with tie-in sales and 
exclusive dealing arrangements. This conjecture has been supported in other studies by 
employing game theory models (e.g., Feinberg, 1984; Hughes and Oughton, 1993). More 
recently, Matsushima (2001) provided a theoretical foundation of the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis by adopting an infinitely repeated game with discounting. This suggests that 
multimarket contacts can lead to implicit collusion and hence sustain firms’ efficiency even in 
the presence of imperfect monitoring. Furthermore, Sorenson (2007) argues that the intensity 
of collusion is facilitated by the reciprocal recognition of multipoint contact rather than by 
market differences or other factors.  
Several studies have found evidence supporting the mutual forbearance hypothesis by 
employing price, entry/exit rates or profitability to indicate the intensity of competition. For 
instance, high price is a signal of less rivalry, Evans and Kessides (1994) provide evidence 
supporting the mutual forbearance hypothesis: airlines with more multipoint contacts avoid 
aggressively low prices because they fear that their rivals might act in the same way in other 
routes. Similarly, Baum and Korn (1996) report that to sustain themselves from their rivals, 
airlines choose to enter in low density routes and exit from high density routes. However, the 
enter/exit rates are lowered with increases in multimarket contacts—especially in markets 
dominated by a single airline. 
Turning to studies about multimarket contact-profitability relationship, Scott (1991) provides 
evidence supporting the linked oligopoly theory by exploring a sample of 64 US firms in 35 
industries. Further analysis shows that the impact of diversified concentration on profits is 
enhanced in the industry with a high level of multimarket linkages among sellers. Conducting 
this study in the UK manufacturing industry, Hughes and Oughton (1993) state that 
multimarket contact is positively related with a rate of return on capital and price-cost 
margins. A positive association between multimarket contact and yields of profits is also 
achieved in the airline industry (e.g., Signal, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1996) or Canadian 
insurance sector (Li and Chuang, 2001).  
Furthermore, Li and Greenwood (2004) argue that the mutual forbearance hypothesis 
advantages under specified conditions. Specifically, multimarket firms can only improve their 
performance through multiple market interactions if they are similar in size. Whalen (1996) 
studied interstate bank holding companies in the US and showed evidences for the mutual 
forbearance nexus in the banking industry: higher multimarket linkages, in conjunction with 
high concentration, are related to higher profitability. Similar results were observed by Pilloff 
(1999): å higher level of outside MMC would reduce competition in a reference market and 
increase profitability of a focal bank. More recently, Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009) 
analyzed a sample of 655 Italian banks over a 4-year period and found that the mutual 
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forbearance hypothesis is more likely for banks heavily exposed to outside contacts. The 
results are robust in terms of different measures of multimarket linkages, different sub-
samples and model specifications. 
2.2. Alternative views about multimarket competition 
The alternative view suggests a pro-competitive effect of multiple market contacts. Solomon 
(1972) proposes that strengthened multimarket linkages result in more competition if the 
multiple competition already exists. Using the perpetual signaling model, Mester (1992) 
found that geographic overlaps promote higher competition if quantity is the strategic 
variable, regardless of imperfect information and finite horizon. For instance, when a firm 
competes with competitors through product quantity, it may initially produce more than its 
actual single-period profit-maximizing quantity. Thus, this may mislead the competitors that 
the firm is a low-cost firm and the competitors would put lower quantity of products on the 
market in the following periods. As a result, the firm can benefit from its quantity advantage 
versus rivals. When the rival firms choose a similar strategy, the level of competition in the 
market will increase. 
This view is empirically supported by studies in different industries. For example, Sandler 
(1988) illustrates that more multiple market contacts with major rivals have increased the 
degree of market rivalry in the US airline industry. This is conceptualized by market share 
variation. The pro-competitive behavior of multimarket contact is also drawn in the mobile 
phone industry (Parker and Roller, 1997). However, Degl’Innocenti et al. (2014) found no 
evidence of the linked oligopoly theory in the leasing industry. In terms of research in 
banking sector, Alexander (1985) found no support of the linked oligopoly theory in loan 
market. This indicates that markets that have high levels of multiple market contact also have 
higher loan rates and fees as well as lower returns on assets. Similar results are achieved in 
Mester (1987) by considering two multimarket contact measures based on the distribution of 
multiple market linkage probability. Moreover, considering the cross product between 
multimarket contact and market concentration, the interaction is found to be more important 
than individual effects. Rhoades and Heggestad (1985) only found partial support for the 
mutual forbearance nexus: multipoint contacts adversely affects the rivalry within markets 
that have no link with returns on assets, service charges or loan rates. With reference to Italian 
banking sector in the 1990s, De Bonis and Ferrando (2000) observed that higher multimarket 
linkage is related to higher competition and lower lending rates, which is contrary to the 
mutual forbearance theory. 
Some other studies propose a U-shaped relationship between multimarket linkages and 
rivalry. Analyzing the competitive interaction between pairs of rivalry airlines, Baum and 
Korn (1999) demonstrate that at the beginning, multimarket contacts induce relatively 
competitive advantage for airlines. This advantage declines with increases in pairwise 
multimarket contacts, The airlines have incentives for competing aggressively. Fuentelsaz and 
Gomez (2006) also find the inverted U-shaped relationship in Spanish banking market, but 
they explain the relationship differently. On one hand, deregulation incentivizes banks with a 
low level of multimarket contacts to enter in the new markets. On the other hand, it reduces 
the entry rates of banks that already have a high level of multiple contacts due to familiarity 
effect and retaliatory threat. 
Recently, studies on multiple market contacts have been drawn in a new perspective to 
consider the effects of competition from multimarket firms on performance of small, single-
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market firms. Hannan and Prager (2004) analyzed the pricing-behavior of single-market 
banks with the presence of multimarket banks and found that pricing behavior of single 
market banks is driven by local market concentration regardless of multimarket banks. 
However this influence is weakened by the growth of multimarket banks’ market share. 
Further, competition from multimarket banks reduces the deposit interest rates offered by 
single-market banks in the same market. This potentially reduces single-market banks’ profits. 
This view is supported by Berger et al. (2007) when they test both the efficiency hypothesis 
and the hubris hypothesis in the US banking market from 1982 to 2000. They found that in 
the 1990s, multimarket banks enjoyed a competitive advantage over single-market banks due 
to their geographic expansion. As a consequence, single-market banks experienced a decline 
in revenues and an increase in costs. A study by Hannan and Prager (2009) isolates the extent 
to which the presence of multimarket banks influences single-market banks’ profitability. 
Dividing the sample by rural and urban markets, they found that the presence of multimarket 
banks only diminishes profitability of a single-market bank in the rural markets. This decline 
is sharper in higher concentration markets and smaller in single-market banks’ size.  
Despite the existence of this literature base, there are some gaps that have not been fulfilled. 
First, the multimarket contact in previous papers is mostly measured at the regional or state 
levels. These are quite broad markets. Second, studies into the relationship between 
multimarket competition and bank performance are still limited—especially studies in the 
context of developing countries. Third, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study 
considering the identification problem related to this causal relationship. In this paper, we aim 
to fill these gaps. 
3. Ukrainian banking system 
The establishment of the modern Ukrainian banking system started from 1991, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Law “On Banks and Banking”. This 
banking system has a two-level structure. The first level is the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU), which serves as the central bank and bank regulator. The second level includes 
commercial banks. The Ukrainian banking system includes a big number of so-called “pocket 
banks”, which serve the particular individual firms or business groups. Moreover, this 
banking system is mostly domestically owned. As of 2015 Q4, of the 113 banks holding 
licenses, there were 41 banks with foreign capital with only 17 banks had 100 percent foreign 
ownership. Figure 1 shows the distribution of all Ukrainian banks and branches across 27 
regions in different periods. Even though Ukrainian banks have been diversifying their 
branches across all regions, the distribution is still unequal: banks are concentrated in some 
main markets while other markets have smaller number of banks. Major markets include the 
Kiev region, Kiev city, and regions of Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and 
Odessa. 
The development of the Ukrainian banking sector after the 2007-2008 financial crisis can be 
divided into three phases. A recovery time (late 2009 to late 2012) was followed by an 
expansion period (late 2012 to early 2014) then a crisis (early 2014 till now). During the 
recovery and expansion periods, lending growth grew from 1.03 percent by 2010 Q4 to 11.78 
percent by 2013 Q4 (National Bank of Ukraine, 2016). Asset growth and deposit growth also 
witnessed the increase of 6.37 percent and 8.19 percent, respectively (Panel A, Figure 1). 
Correspondingly, Ukrainian banks steadily expanded their activities and branches all over the 
country resulting in a significant increase in the number of banks and branches over this 
period (Panel B, Figure 1).  
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Since 2014, the deep recession of the economy, together with the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and the armed confrontation in two eastern regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) have had 
negative effects on the banking system. As of 2015 Q4, the banking sector has lost about four 
percent of assets and loans along with 1.55 percent loss of deposits. Following Regulation No. 
260 issued by the National Bank of Ukraine (2014), all Ukrainian credit institutions 
completely suspended their operation in Crimea and withdrew from this peninsula. Further, 
some banks also announced the closure of some (or most) of their branches in the self-
proclaimed regions. This results in a steep reduction in the number of banks and branches—
especially in the occupied regions and their neighboring regions. 
In comparison with banking systems in other Eastern European countries, the Ukrainian 
banking system has more banks and branches. For example, as of 2015 Q1, there are 46 banks 
in Czech Republic (Czech National Bank, 2016) and 28 banks in Slovakia (National bank of 
Slovakia, 2016). This is about one third of the Ukrainian banking size. The banking systems 
closest in terms of size to the Ukrainian banking are the Polish and Hungarian banking 
systems with about 605 banks (The Polish Bank Association, 2016) and 126 banks (The 
Banks, 2016), respectively. However, their structures are totally different. As mentioned 
earlier, the banking sector in Ukraine is dominated by domestically-owned commercial banks 
while about a half of banks in Hungary are mortgage and savings banks and co-operative 
banks dominate the Polish banking sector. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. The econometric model 
4.1.1. Baseline specification 
To investigate the relationship between repeated competition and bank profitability, we first 
estimated the economic model and examined the repeated competition-performance 
relationship using the fixed-effects estimator. Next, using a differences-in-differences 
approach, we provide a clean identification of a causal effect of multimarket competition on 
bank performance in the presence of the exogenous shock. Finally, we checked the robustness 
of our results by using different sets of samples and a variety of weighting strategy in the 
analysis. 
Multimarket competition and profitability 
To test the role of multimarket competition on bank performance, we estimate the following 
equations: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)  
where the subscript i is the index of banks. The dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). 
We measure the degree of multimarket competition by multimarket contact. Since the 
performance of banks could be affected by bank-specific characteristics, we also consider a 
vector of bank-level variables including: (1) bank size measured by natural logarithm of the 
bank’s assets (Size) (2) the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (Liquidity); (3) the equity ratio 
(Equity); (4) the deposit ratio (Deposit/Total assets); and (5) the loans-to-assets ratio 
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(Loans/Total assets). Additionally, a vector of time fixed effects (𝑣𝑡), and bank fixed effects
2 
(𝑣𝑖), are also included into the specification. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Appendix A 
contains the detailed definitions of all variables. 
Bank size has been widely used as a determinant of profitability. However studies into this 
relationship provide ambiguous results. According to economics of scale, bank size tends to 
have a positive impact on banks’ profits because larger banks are more likely to save more 
operating costs. Thus, they are more efficient (e.g., Pasiouras and Hosmidou, 2007). There is 
also a possible trade-off between bank growth and profitability in which banks experience 
diseconomies of scale. Thus, bank size may have negative impact on profits (e.g., Baumol, 
1959). Further, Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) suggest a U-shaped size-profitability 
relationship: small banks can benefit from economies of scale when they grow in size while 
profits of large banks are lower because they no longer benefit from economies of scale along 
with higher costs. 
It is expected to be safer for banks to hold more liquid assets and to have a higher capital-to-
assets ratio. According to the conventional risk-return theory, those banks are considered to 
have lower returns than riskier banks (e.g, Berger, 1995). In contrast, banks with higher 
liquidity ratio and equity ratio are less likely to go bankrupt even they experience a short 
period of difficult time (e.g., Berger, 1995). Additionally, a higher level of capitalization helps 
banks avoid the cost premium of external funding, which in return could have a positive effect 
on its profitability (e.g., Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Molyneux and Forbes, 
1995; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009). 
Loans and deposit are the two main sources of banks’ profits. On the one hand, more loans 
and deposits generate more profits. On the other hand, they may have negative impacts on 
profitability because if loans are composed mostly of high-risk loans, more loans are 
associated with higher potential losses (e.g, Miller and Noulas, 1997). Also, the extent that 
increases in deposits contribute to profits depends on the banks’ ability to convert deposit 
liabilities into income-earning assets. Furthermore, if the deposit is converted into low credit 
assets such as high-risk loans, more deposits could mitigate banks’ profitability (e.g., Dietrich 
and Wanzenried, 2011). 
Model (1) is estimated for the sample of multimarket banks. We estimate multimarket 
competition at both the regional and the city level. In terms of market definition at the city 
level, we first defined the center city of each region as a market. Alternatively, we also 
consider cities that have at least 30 and 50 bank branches as our second and third definition of 
a market at city level, respectively3. Urban villages, villages and settlements are excluded 
from our sample. The competition is first considered in all regions and is then later considered 
in unoccupied regions. To avoid causal ambiguity, we use 1-quarter lag of all independent 
variables. We estimate model (1) using the fixed-effects estimator to control for time-
invariant and bank-specific heterogeneity. 
Identification strategy using quasi-experimental design 
It has been widely recognized in finance research that naïve regression might fail to identify 
causal effects. One of the major obstacles in causal inference is the omitted variable bias that 
                                                 
2 Bank fixed effects include ownership and bank group. The National Bank of Ukraine classifies banks into 4 
groups based on their total assets. 
3 We also test with cities with at least 10, 15 and 20 bank branches. The results are more or less similar. 
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can be partly addressed by the fixed-effects strategy used in the first part of our analysis. 
However this strategy is only useful in dealing with unobserved individual characteristics but 
not with unobserved confounders at the more aggregate level. To address the concern of 
endogeneity, we adopted a differences-in-difference method given by the exogenous political 
dispute between Ukraine and Russia. The idea is that because the conflict was unexpected, 
banks could not change their competitive strategy beforehand to deal with the new 
competitive environment.4 
Since the conflict mainly affects the occupied regions and some other southeastern regions, 
banks with more branches in these regions are more likely to be affected. Hence, we define 
those banks to be the treatment group and assign the banks with smaller share in affected 
regions as the control group. The main assumption in this identification strategy is that in the 
absence of the quasi-experiment, there is no difference between treatment group (banks that 
are more affected) and control group (banks that are less affected) in terms of competitive 
attitude and the benefits from multimarket competition. Our model is specified as follows:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where the control and treatment groups are categorized by the continuous treatment, Share, 
which is the share of branches in affected southeastern regions5. It takes value of 0 for pre-
conflict period6. We estimate model (2) using the four quarters before and the four quarters 
after 2014 Q1 to control for the delay of the impact.  
4.1.2. Multimarket contact measures 
In the literature, multimarket contact is measured based on either the counting basis or the 
probability basis. The counting method calculates contacts in four different levels: dyad-in-
market level7 (e.g., Scott, 1982), dyad level8 (e.g., Baum and Korn, 1999), firm level (e.g., 
Gimeno and Woo, 1996) and market level (e.g., Feinberg, 1985). The most common firm 
level measure accounts for the average number of contacts of a bank i in quarter t.  
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Here, 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the number of markets in which bank i and its rival j operate simultaneously in 
quarter t, and 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of banks that meet bank i in at least one market in quarter 
t. This non-weighting measure does not consider the difference in banks’ competitive attitude 
towards the different multimarket rivals. Thus, we modify this measure and compute three 
multimarket linkage measures to make use of different weighting factors as follows9. This 
approach of calculating multimarket linkage has been also employed in previous papers (see 
e.g., Li and Greenwood, 2004; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2009; Degl’Innocenti et al., 2014).  
                                                 
4 For references of papers using similar approach, see Bonin et al. (2005), Boubakri et al. (2005), Micco et al. 
(2007), Yang and Zhao (2014), Hanlon et al. (2015), Qian et al. (2015), Cerqueiro et al. (2016) or Gilje et al. 
(2016). 
5 Affected southeastern regions include Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odesa.  
6 Pre-conflict period is the period before 2014Q1.  
7 Dyad-in-level measure calculates every possible within-market pairs of a firm and its rivals. 
8 Dyad level measure calculates geographic overlaps of every pairwise rivals. 
9 Numeric example for multimarket contact measures is specified in Appendix C.  
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Banks are more likely to give attention to similar sized competitors as they face similar 
regulations (e.g., capital requirement) and have similar types of products and customers. Thus, 
the first weighting factor considers the similarity of bank i and bank j (in terms of their market 
shares) in the markets they meet. The market share is the ratio of all branches of bank i in 
market k to total branches of all bank in market k in quarter t.  
𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =
𝑏𝑟a𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑡
 
The similarity index between banks i and j, 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗, is the sum of the absolute differences of the 
market shares for all markets where they coincide. 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡|
𝑘
 
The minimum value of SI index is 0 (when banks have the same market share in every 
market) and the maximum value of SI index is close to the number of markets in which banks 
coincide (when banks are very dissimilarity in terms of market shares). The smaller SI is more 
similar when two banks are in terms of market shares. Then SI is used to calculate the first 
weighting factor (𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖
) that ranges between 0 and 1. This increases with the similarity. 
Essentially, this measure is the basic measure of multimarket contact weighted by 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡, or we 
can consider it as the interaction between the basic measure and 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡. 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖
=
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
1 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
The second weighting factor, 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
, reflects the importance of the rival bank j based on the 
number of markets in which bank i meets bank j. The more markets they meet, the more 
familiar they have. This might affect the banks’ competitive strategy. Banks would pay more 
attention to those rivals that coincide with them in more markets. Thus, 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
 is calculated as: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
=
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total markets in which bank i operates at least one branch in quarter t. 
Then the second multimarket indicator, 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 , is defined as: 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
  
The third measure of weighting factor reflects the size (in terms of market share) of the rival j 
as follows: 
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𝑤𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑖
=
∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
This indicator ranges between 0 to 1, and increases with the size of the rival j. This measure 
indirectly indicates the competitive position of a bank versus its multimarket rivals. 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
4.2. Data and sample 
Our original sample contains 4,739 observations of 214 Ukrainian banks with financial data 
available from 2009 Q1 to 2015 Q4. After dropping those cases for which variables are 
missing or misleading, our final sample contains 209 Ukrainian banks with 4,687 
observations10. Our panel is unbalanced and allows for both entry and exit. In terms of data 
about branch location, we exclude Crimea because Russia annexed it in March 2014. 
Ukrainian banks had withdrawn from this market completely after the annexation. Thus, the 
available data about bank branches in Crimea—even the data in the pre-conflict period—are 
very limited. Our branch dataset contains 34,434 observations with detailed information about 
location as well as the open and close dates of all branches. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all banks. Overall, the Ukrainian banking system 
experiences a poor performance with a negative average return. The average values of other 
bank-specific variables are relatively similar to those in other Eastern European emerging 
markets (see, e.g., Mirzaei et al., 2013). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for samples of 
multimarket banks and single-market banks11. By dividing banks into single-market banks 
and multimarket banks (at the regional level and at the center-city level12), we can compare 
the statistics between two sub-samples. The mean values of return on assets of single-market 
banks are positive while than those of multi-market banks are negative. Using the t-test to test 
the mean difference between the two groups, we found that the difference is statistically 
significant. The volatility of return on assets of multimarket banks is also higher than those of 
single-market banks. These signs hold when we compare the mean difference between 
multimarket and single-market banks at the center city level. It is possible that multimarket 
banks are exposed to more risks versus single-market banks because they have lower liquidity 
ratios and lower equity ratios. However, multimarket banks experience higher deposit ratios 
and loan-to-assets ratios than single-market banks. These differences are weakened at the city 
level.   
Panel B in Figure 2 displays the changes in number of banks and branches over time. In terms 
of number of banks, the highest number of banks was 181 banks in 2014 Q1 and the lowest 
number of banks was 113 banks in 2015 Q4. Although the number of banks fluctuates from 
2009 to late 2014, the number of branches gradually increased over that period. However, 
after 2014 Q1, there was a sharp downward trend in both the number of banks and branches. 
                                                 
10 This is the number of banks in our sample. Due to the entry/exit of several banks, number of banks in each 
quarter may be less than 209. 
11 Multimarket banks are those operating in more than one market; single-market banks are those operating in 
only one market. 
12 At regional level, each Ukrainian region (except from Crimea) is defined as a market. At center-city level, 
each center city (as given by the National Bank of Ukraine) is defined as a market. 
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Regarding the changes in the average multimarket contacts (Panel C, Figure 2), multimarket 
contacts weighted by the similarity and multimarket contacts weighted by the ratio of 
coincided markets increased steadily from 2009 to the third quarter of 2012, and then 
fluctuated during 2013 and the late 2014 period and then dropped dramatically afterwards. 
This evolution is in line with the development of the Ukrainian banking system as specified in 
Section 3. In contrast, multimarket contacts weighted by the size of the rivals increased after 
2014. The difference in the changes of contact measures can be explained by the difference in 
employed weighting factors. As stated above, the third weighting factor accounts for the mere 
size of the competitors. While the numbers of banks and branches have dropped significantly 
since 2014, market shares of the remained banks would be larger. This overall increases the 
magnitude of the third multimarket contact measure. 
In 2014 Q1, two pro-Russian regions in the eastern Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk, self-
proclaimed themselves to be independent states. Crimea was also integrated into Russia 
leading to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Corresponding to this conflict, the 
number of banks in those regions as well as some other regions decreased significantly (Panel 
D, Figure 2). Most of the affected regions are located in the southeastern part of Ukraine and 
share borders with occupied regions. It is worth assessing the impact of multimarket 
competition on bank performance in relation with the political shock with reference to the 
share in occupied and affected southeastern regions because the reduction in number of banks 
and branches could lessen the competitiveness in the markets.  
5. Results and discussions 
5.1. Multimarket competition and banks’ profitability 
Table 3 reports the fixed-effects regression results for competition at the regional level with 
the sample of multimarket banks. In columns (1)-(3), we use multimarket contact weighted by 
the similarity, the coincided markets ratio and the rival’s mere size, respectively. We found 
that a general multimarket competition enhances banks’ profitability but the signs vary 
depending on the employed multipoint contact measures. The coefficients on multimarket 
competition weighted by the similarity and the coincided market ratios are significant and 
positive, but the coefficient for multiple market contacts is weighted by the size of the rivals 
and is negative but insignificant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in 
multimarket contact weighted by the size similarity results in 1.73% increase in returns on 
assets while one standard deviation increase in multimarket contact weighted by the 
overlapped markets ratio improves bank performance by 1.13%.   
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
Estimated results for the effects of multimarket competition at the city level are reported in 
Table 4. Columns (1)-(2) display results for competition in center cities, while columns (3) 
and (4) refer to the competition in cities with at least 50 branches and cities with at least 30 
branches, respectively. For the sake of space, we only report regressions with significant 
coefficients on multimarket competition. We also acknowledge the positive association 
between multimarket competition at the city level and bank performance. Moreover, the 
coefficients of repeated contact are significant only if we control for the size similarity and 
overlapped markets ratio.  
This is consistent with previous findings. Particularly, multimarket banks repeatedly 
competing in center cities can improve their returns on assets by about 1.47-2% with one 
12 
 
standard deviation increase in multipoint linkages. This effect is stronger than the effect at the 
regional level in terms of sign because the coefficients on multimarket competition at regional 
level are only significant at 10 percent significance level regardless of employed measures. 
Consistently, profits of multiple market banks can rise by about 1.61-1.92% with one standard 
deviation increase in contacts if the banks compete in cities that have at least 30 branches and 
50 branches, respectively.  
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Referring to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia, we excluded all occupied 
regions (Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk) from our data and re-measured our multimarket 
competition13. Previous findings are confirmed when we acknowledge that the estimation 
results in Table 5 are consistent with the results presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Generally, 
multipoint competition is positively associated with banks’ profitability. In addition, we get 
stronger signs for this relationship at both the regional and city levels when excluding the 
occupied regions from our sample. This suggests that the level of competition as well as the 
performance of the Ukrainian banking industry is somewhat affected by the political issues.  
When competition at the regional level, multimarket banks can improve their profits by 1.60-
1.89% with one standard deviation in multimarket contacts. At the city level, the increases in 
profitability are 1.25-2.13%, 1.29-2.05%, and 2.27% with reference to competition in center 
cities, cities with at least 50 branches and cities with at least 30 branches, respectively. 
Although the magnitudes of the competition in different types of markets are more or less 
similar, but the signs are quite different. When we consider the competition in center cities, 
cities with at least 50 branches and cities with at least 30 branches both show decreasing 
strength of the effect. The central locations as well as the number of banks and branches in the 
market indicate the competitive level of that market. This result suggests that banks can get 
more benefits from geographic overlaps if they coincide in more competitive markets.  
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
As a whole, our results support the mutual forbearance hypothesis—banks can benefit from 
repeated competition. Despite the differences in employed industries, multimarket contact 
measures and econometrics techniques, these results are in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Scott, 1991; Whalen, 1996; Li and Chuang, 2001). Moreover, the results for multimarket 
measure account for market share similarity in our study and are consistent with the results 
achieved by Li and Greenwood (2004) regardless of different employed industries. Li and 
Greenwood (2004) account for the similarity in revenue collecting from overlapped markets 
when calculating multimarket linkage. They also found that the positive impact of multipoint 
contact on the performance of Canadian insurance companies increases with firm similarity. 
Furthermore—consistent with those other studies—we also argue that the anti-competitive 
effect is facilitated by the information advantage. More specifically, repeated competition 
allows banks to collect more relevant information about the rivals. This rises awareness about 
the competitive retaliation. Consequently, multipoint market banks should avoid aggressive 
competition and co-operate instead. 
This effect is strengthened if banks compete with the multipoint rivals in more competitive 
markets. This suggests that when banks operate simultaneously in multiple markets with a 
high level of competitiveness, they tend to not compete aggressively towards others. In 
                                                 
13 See Table B1 for descriptive statistics of multimarket competition indicators with reference to the exclusion.  
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contrast, the coincidences induce incentives for banks to cooperate and have reciprocal 
exchanges. However, not all multimarket rivals are treated similarly. The cooperating 
incentive is strongest if two competitors are relatively similar in terms of market shares. 
Similarly, banks have incentives to mutual forbear when they have more overlapped markets. 
However, multimarket competition no longer has anti-competitive effect if the mere size of 
the competitors is considered. In other words, relatively smaller banks do not benefit by 
competing with bigger ones in multiple markets. The argument is that banks will pay more 
attention to the size-similar competitors because they have common interests and setups 
including targeted customers or services. This induces mutual forbearance among the 
multimarket rivals that are in the same size category. Moreover, more geographic overlaps 
increase the familiarity between banks and this makes multimarket competitors more salient. 
As a result, banks will avoid aggressive competition with those rivals. On the contrary, if 
banks do not have strong competitive positions, such as banks with small market share, they 
cannot benefit from their multimarket contact. 
In terms of impacts of bank-specific variables on profitability, deposit-to-assets ratio is 
positively and significantly related to returns on assets even though the coefficient is only 
significant at 10 percent significance level. This suggests that the Ukrainian banks can 
transfer deposit liabilities into earnings. We also observe that bank size and loan-to-asset 
ratios have negative coefficients, while liquidity ratio and equity ratio have positive 
coefficients. However, those coefficients are insignificant regardless of employed samples. 
5.2. Identification strategies using a quasi-experimental design 
Before estimating model (2), we need to test the assumption that with the absence of the 
exogenous shock, there is no difference between the treatment group and the control group 
regarding the impact of repeated competition on profitability. Our treatment is a continuous 
variable, and we cannot use the traditional way. This tests the mean difference of the 
dependent variable between two groups. Alternatively, we tested the assumption indirectly by 
adding a new variable, Pre_conflict, into model (1). This variable equals the share in affected 
regions for all quarters before 2014 Q1 and equals 0 for post-conflict period. The regressions 
results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. Consistent with the assumption, the coefficients 
on this variable are insignificant suggesting a parallel trend of treatment group and control 
group in the absence of the shock. Further, the coefficients of interest are consistent with the 
ones in regression without this control variable. 
Because the parallel assumption is satisfied, we identify the role of multimarket competition 
on bank performance in the presence of political dispute by estimating model (2). Regression 
results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. The coefficient for repeated competition weighted 
by the size similarity is significant at the 10 percent level while multimarket competition 
weighted by the overlapped market ratio loses its significance. However the coefficients on 
the interaction term between repeated competition and share of branches in affected regions 
are negative and significant in all regressions. The results suggest that in the post-conflict 
period, the share of branches in affected regions weakens the effect of multipoint competition. 
More specifically, after 2014 Q1, banks with higher share in affected southeastern regions in 
previous periods no longer benefit from multimarket competition. This complements our 
previous finding that bank incentives to co-operate with their multipoint rivals change 
depending on the importance of the rivals and the competitiveness of the markets.  
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The competitiveness of the whole system is reduced with a significant decrease in the number 
of banks and branches because the conflict hits the east and affects not only the occupied 
regions but other regions as well. This lessens the competitiveness of the markets. In addition, 
even though the conflict influences the entire banking system, banks having more branches in 
the affected regions are more affected than others because they experienced a sharper branch 
reduction or their banks were revoked. In other words, after the conflict, more affected banks 
no longer have size similarity with less affected banks. As a result, less affected banks may 
not want to mutual forbear with more affected counterparts.  
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
5.3. Robustness of tests and results 
The robustness of previous results can be tested by a wide set of tests. First, we re-estimated 
model (1) with different samples. Instead of samples of multimarket banks, we estimate 
model (1) with reference to the samples of all banks and domestic banks. The fixed-effect 
regressions results are presented in Table B2. We observed consistent results for multimarket 
competition weighted by the size similarity with positive and significant coefficients. 
Interestingly, regardless of samples of multimarket competition, we get negative and 
significant coefficients on multimarket competition weighted by the rival’s size when we 
include both multimarket and single-market banks in our regressions. On the one hand, this 
result strengthens our previous findings about the importance of geographic overlaps in 
profitability improvement. On the other hand, it supports our argument that banks tend to not 
co-operate with unimportant competitors. This may harm the performance of small and 
single-market banks. 
Regarding competition in all regions, one standard deviation increase in multipoint contacts at 
the regional level leads to an increase of 0.041% in profits for all banks and 0.048% increase 
in profits for domestic banks. Similarly, if multimarket contacts at the center city level 
increase by one standard deviation, profits of all banks can be improved by 0.038% while 
domestic banks’ returns can increase by 0.046%. For the sample of competition in unoccupied 
regions, we find similar results: positive and significant coefficients on repeated contacts are 
weighted similarly; negative and significant coefficients on multimarket contacts of all banks 
are weighted by the size of the rivals.  
Second, it is possible that the relationship between multipoint competition and profitability 
could be driven by the development of the overlapped markets. We check this possibility by 
constructing the other multimarket contact measure weighted by the ratio of developed 
coincided markets to total coincided markets then re-estimate model (1) for this measure. We 
expect to find a stronger magnitude of the anti-competitive effect of this multimarket 
competition measure. The detailed measure is specified as follows: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
4
𝑖
=
𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
4 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
4
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
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Here, 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the number of financial and industrial developed regions
14 in 
which two banks meet each other. The results for regressions with this measure are reported 
in Table B3. We find positive and significant coefficients on multimarket competition at both 
the regional level and the center city level regardless of employed samples. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the coefficients in these regressions is significantly higher than those in 
regressions with other competition measures. This suggests that repeated competition in more 
developed markets brings more benefits to banks than competing in less developed markets. 
Third, to test the robustness of our identification strategy, we employ the traditional 
differences-in-differences method in which the treatment and control groups are divided by a 
binary variable instead of continuous variable. More specifically, we modified model (2) as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
Here, Treatment equals 1 if the share of branches in affected regions is more than 20 percent; 
0 otherwise; Post equals 1 for the period after 2014 Q1 and 0 otherwise.  
Before estimating model (3), we also tested the validity of the parallel trend assumption of the 
dependent variable for the treatment and control groups prior to the conflict. We estimate the 
mean difference between the two groups before the treatment and found that the difference is 
insignificant (Panel A, Table B4). Although there is a significant difference in other banks’ 
characteristics between two groups, the differences-in-differences method does not require a 
parallel trend in any variables other than the dependent variable. Hence these differences 
would not affect our results. Panel B of Table B4 presents estimated results for model (3), and 
the results are consistent with the ones from differences-in-differences approach using 
continuous treatment. That is, after the conflict, less affected banks do not have incentives to 
mutually forbear with more affected banks. 
Fourth, it is possible that our results are driven by multimarket competition in other regions 
rather than competition in south-eastern regions15. If banks do not benefit from repeated 
competition in south-eastern regions, classifying treatment and control groups by the share in 
affected southeastern regions would not be appropriate. To rule out this possibility, we re-
estimated model (1) with reference to multimarket competition in southeastern regions only. 
The estimation results are presented in Panel C of Table B4. The coefficients on repeated 
competition in southeastern regions are positive and significant at 10% significance level. 
This suggests that without the presence of the external shock, banks can improve their 
profitability by competing in the southeastern part of Ukraine regardless of their share in 
those regions. 
6. Conclusions 
Multimarket contact has been well documented in the literature with reference to different 
industries. Turning to the issue of multimarket competition in banking industry, there is an 
ongoing debate about whether or not banks can benefit from competing in multiple markets. 
                                                 
14 Financial and industrial developed regions include Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv city, Kyiv region, 
Lviv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia. 
15 South-eastern regions include: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa and 
Zaporizhzhia. 
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However studies examining the multiple market contact-profitability relationship have been 
marginal—mainly due to the lack of relevant data and problem of the identification strategy.  
In this paper, we address these three issues. First, we document to what extend multimarket 
competition, indicated by multipoint linkage, affects banks’ profitability. Second, we studied 
whether the effect differs according to different levels of markets. Third, we studied the 
causal inference between multimarket competition and profitability in the presence of the 
exogenous shock. 
For the purposes of analysis, we employed a sample of the Ukrainian banking market from 
2009 Q1 to 2015 Q4. Our first set of empirical results indicates that multimarket contacts can 
improve banks’ profitability through anti-competition effect. Furthermore, the positive 
association between multipoint competition and banks’ profitability is strongest when in-
paired multimarket rivals are highly close in terms of market shares. On the contrary, banks 
do not have incentives to cooperate if their multipoint rivals are relatively smaller. Our results 
are robust when we adopt different samples as well as measure competition at different levels. 
We also find stronger evidence for the positive relationship between multimarket contact and 
financial performance if we exclude occupied regions from our sample. In the second part of 
the analysis, we found consistent evidence for the anti-competitive effect by exploiting 
differences-in-differences approach as an identification strategy. Further investigation shows 
that this effect is weakened by the political shock caused by the change in banks’ competitive 
attitude. More specifically, banks have more share in the affected regions and are more 
affected by the conflict. Thus, they are not considered to be important competitors. Together 
with the less competitive condition of the markets, in the aftermath of the conflict, the less 
affected banks no longer have incentives to co-operate with those more affected multimarket 
rivals. 
These results have important implications for the future changes in banking system structure. 
First, consolidation of small and medium banks should be promoted. Thus, consolidated 
banks can improve their competitiveness and gain benefits from anti-competition effect of 
multimarket contacts. Second, regulators should encourage banks to operate new branches in 
remote or less competitive markets. One the one hand, this brings convenience for customers 
in terms of finance access. On the other hand, it enhances competitiveness of the markets. 
This in turn incentivizes multimarket banks to co-operate to get mutual benefits.  
This study can be extended to further research in several ways. First, if we can collect branch-
specific balance sheet data, we can examine the anti-competition effect induced by 
multimarket contacts in more details. For examples, we can investigate to what extent 
multimarket competitors cooperate with each other. Second, it might be worthwhile to address 
the relationship between the performance of the banking system and political issues with 
reference to the current dispute between Ukraine and Russia in more detail. 
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 Figure 1. Banks and branches distribution 
 
This figure displays the distribution of Ukrainian banks and branches across 27 regions. The white parts refer to occupied 
regions (Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk). The darker shading indicates relatively more banks/branches in the region. 
 Figure 2. Development of Ukrainian banking system over time (2009-2015) 
 
Panel A displays the growth of assets, loan and deposit from 2010 to 2015. Panel B displays the evolution of branches and 
banks in the Ukrainian banking system (2009Q1-2015Q4). The vertical axis on the right shows the range of number of 
branches. Panel C displays the decline in number of banks and number of branches in post-conflict period (after 2014Q1) in 
most affected regions. These regions, along with three occupied regions (Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk), are top 10 most 
affected regions. Panel D displays the evolution of average multimarket contacts corresponding to different measures at 
regional level and center city level (2009Q1-2015Q4). The vertical axis on the right shows the range of multimarket contact 
(MMC) weighted by the size of rivals. 
Panel B 
Panel C Panel D 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sample of all regions, all banks. 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 N 
 Multimarket competition at regional level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.865 3.723 4687 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.517 2.711 4687 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.063 0.047 4687 
 Multimarket competition at center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.494 3.607 4687 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.262 2.652 4687 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.060 0.046 4687 
 Banks’ profitability 
 ROA   -0.012 0.106 4660 
 Bank-specific variables 
Size 14.225 1.584 4684 
Liquidity 0.160 0.158 4572 
Equity 0.243 0.191 4593 
Loan/Total assets 0.649 0.271 4682 
Deposit/Total assets 0.515 0.850 4680 
Descriptive statistics for all banks in the sample of all regions. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is natural logarithm 
of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; 
Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of 
total deposit to total assets. 
 Table 2. Descriptive statistics for sample of all regions, multimarket banks vs. single-
market banks. 
 Multimarket banks Single-market banks Difference 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀 𝑆𝐷𝑀 𝑁𝑀 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 𝑆𝐷𝑆 𝑁𝑆 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀
− 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 
 Regional level 
MMC weighted by 
similarity  
6.573 3.453 4,092 - - - - 
MMC weighted by 
coincided markets ratio   
5.028 2.521 4,092 - - - - 
MMC weighted by rival’s 
size   
0.071 0.045 4,092 - - - - 
ROA -0.014 0.112 4,076 0.002 0.042 584 -0.016*** 
Size 14.404 1.547 4,089 12.998 1.252 595 1.406*** 
Liquidity 0.152 0.145 3,997 0.220 0.220 575 -0.068*** 
Equity 0.218 0.161 4,001 0.409 0.275 592 -0.190*** 
Loan/Total assets 0.672 0.265 4,089 0.495 0.260 593 0.176*** 
Deposit/Total assets 0.534 0.902 4,089 0.383 0.260 591 0.151*** 
 Center city level 
MMC weighted by 
similarity  
6.305 3.324 3,972 - - - - 
MMC weighted by 
coincided markets ratio   
4.849 2.457 3,972 - - - - 
MMC weighted by rival’s 
size   
0.070 0.044 3,972 - - - - 
ROA -0.015 0.114 3,957 0.002 0.041 703 -0.016*** 
Size 14.446 1.540 3,969 13.002 1.224 715 1.444*** 
Liquidity 0.153 0.146 3,880 0.202 0.208 692 -0.049*** 
Equity 0.215 0.159 3,882 0.392 0.266 711 -0.177*** 
Loan/Total assets 0.672 0.268 3,969 0.521 0.252 713 0.151*** 
Deposit/Total assets 0.535 0.915 3,969 0.405 0.252 711 0.130*** 
Descriptive statistics for multimarket and single-market banks in the sample of all regions. Difference  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 is mean differences and t-test significance. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of 
total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposit/Total 
assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of total deposit to 
total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 3. Effect of multimarket competition at regional level on multimarket banks 
performance. 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Multimarket competition    0.005* (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) -0.172 (0.197) 
Size         -0.000 (0.012) 0.000 (0.012) 0.001 (0.012) 
Liquidity    0.044 (0.037) 0.044 (0.037) 0.0431 (0.0367) 
Equity       -0.042 (0.044) -0.043 (0.044) -0.046 (0.043) 
Loans/Total assets 0.018 (0.027) 0.019 (0.027) 0.018 (0.027) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.039* (0.023) 0.039* (0.023) 0.045** (0.023) 
Quarter and year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,876 3,876 3,876 
Adj. R-Square 0.054 0.054 0.054 
This table reports fixed-effects regressions for multimarket banks in the sample of all regions. The multimarket competition 
at regional level in columns (1)-(3) is indicated by multimarket contact in all regions weighted by size similarity, coincided 
markets ratio and rivals’ size, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant 
term is estimated but not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio 
of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total 
deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
Table 4. Effect of multimarket competition at city levels on multimarket banks 
performance. 
 Center city level 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
             
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by 
coincided markets 
ratio 
 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition    0.006** (0.003)    0.006* (0.003)    0.004* (0.002)    0.003* (0.002)    
Size         -0.001 (0.012)    -0.000 (0.012)    -0.000 (0.012)    -0.000 (0.012)    
Liquidity    0.045 (0.038)    0.044 (0.038)    0.045 (0.037)    0.045 (0.037)    
Equity       -0.043 (0.044)    -0.044 (0.044)    -0.041 (0.043)    -0.042 (0.043)    
Loans/Total assets 0.017 (0.027)    0.017 (0.027)    0.018 (0.027)    0.018 (0.027)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.041* (0.023)    0.042* (0.023)    0.040* (0.023)    0.040* (0.023)    
Quarter and year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         3,764            3,764            3,911            3,911    
Adj. R-Square       0.055          0.055          0.055          0.054    
This table reports fixed-effects regressions for multimarket banks in the sample of all regions. The multimarket competition 
in columns (1) and (2) is indicated by multimarket contact at center city level weighted by size similarity and coincided 
markets ratio, respectively. The multimarket competition in columns (3) and (4) is indicated by multimarket contact in cities 
having at least 50 branches and 30 branches which is weighted by size similarity, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over 
total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit 
is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 5. Effect of multimarket competition in unoccupied regions on multimarket banks 
performance. 
 Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 
branches) 
 MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted 
by 
similarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Multimarket 
competition    
0.006** 
(0.003)    
0.007* 
(0.004)    
0.006** 
(0.003)    
0.007** 
(0.003)    
0.005** 
(0.003)    
0.005* 
(0.003)    
0.005* 
(0.003)    
   
Size         0.0007 
(0.0124)    
0.0009 
(0.0124)    
0.0007 
(0.0126)    
0.0008 
(0.0125)    
0.0002 
(0.0124)    
0.0006 
(0.0123)    
0.0002 
(0.0124)    
Liquidity    0.0403 
(0.0371)    
0.0399 
(0.0371)    
0.0401 
(0.0378)    
0.0398 
(0.0378)    
0.0424 
(0.0370)    
0.0417 
(0.0370)    
0.0424 
(0.0370)    
Equity       -0.0399 
(0.0446)    
-0.0411 
(0.0445)    
-0.0389 
(0.0456)    
-0.0401 
(0.0456)    
-0.0397 
(0.0445)    
-0.0405 
(0.0445)    
-0.0402 
(0.0445)    
Loans/Total assets 0.0125 
(0.0276)    
0.0130 
(0.0275)    
0.0107 
(0.0281)    
0.0110 
(0.0280)    
0.0131 
(0.0275)    
0.0132 
(0.0274)    
0.0132 
(0.0275)    
Deposits/Total 
assets 
0.0385* 
(0.0228)    
0.0389* 
(0.0227)    
0.0405* 
(0.0233)    
0.0409* 
(0.0232)    
0.0401* 
(0.0231)    
0.0414* 
(0.0229)    
0.0404* 
(0.0231)    
Quarter and year 
fixed-effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations     3,829          3,829          3,704          3,704            3,851          3,851            3,851    
Adj. R-Square     0.055        0.054        0.056         0.056          0.055        0.055          0.055    
This table reports fixed-effects regressions for sample of multimarket banks. The multimarket competition in columns (1)-
(7) is indicated by multimarket contact in unoccupied regions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over 
total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit 
is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 6. Results for quasi-experimental approach. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: The parallel trend of treatment and control banks in pre-conflict period 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition 0.006** (0.003)    0.006* (0.003)    -0.148 (0.205)    
Size         -0.000 (0.012)    -0.000 (0.012)    0.001 (0.012)    
Liquidity    0.045 (0.037)    0.045 (0.037)    0.044 (0.037)    
Equity       -0.047 (0.044)    -0.048 (0.044)    -0.051 (0.044)    
Loans/Total assets 0.019 (0.027)    0.020 (0.027)    0.019 (0.027)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.037* (0.022)    0.038* (0.022)    0.043* (0.022)    
Pre_conflict 0.034 (0.023)    0.033 (0.023)    0.032 (0.023)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         3,876    3,876            3,876    
Adj. R-Square       0.055          0.055          0.055   
Panel B: The effect of multimarket competition on profitability in relation with exogenous shock 
 MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition     0.022* (0.013)    0.022 (0.015)    0.229 (1.010)    
MMC*share in affected regions -0.010* (0.005)    -0.014* (0.007)    -0.940* (0.526)    
Size         0.064* (0.038)    0.065* (0.038)    0.069* (0.037)    
Liquidity    -0.009 (0.091)    -0.013 (0.090)    -0.020 (0.090)    
Equity       -0.114 (0.153)    -0.117 (0.153)    -0.114 (0.152)    
Loans/Total assets -0.069 (0.124)    -0.068 (0.123)    -0.066 (0.123)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.126 (0.098)    0.127 (0.099)    0.139 (0.101)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect No  No  No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         1,081            1,081            1,081    
Adj. R-Square       0.077          0.076          0.076    
Panel A reports fixed-effects regressions testing the parallel trend of the treatment and control banks for the pre-conflict 
period. Panel B reports fixed-effects differences-in-differences regression with continuous treatment. Regression is estimated 
for multimarket domestic banks. The constant term is estimated but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity 
over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total 
assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Appendix A. Variable description. 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Multimarket competition 
MMC weighted by 
similarity 
Multimarket contact measure weighted by similarity 
𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑡
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡|
𝑘
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
1 =
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚i𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
1 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
MMC weighted by 
coincided markets ratio Multimarket contact measure weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
2 =
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total markets in which bank i 
operates at least one branch in quarter t. 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
MMC weighted by rival’s 
size 
Multimarket contact measure weighted by rival’s size 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
Bank-specific variables 
ROA Net profit over total assets  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets +/- 
Equity Total equity over total assets +/- 
Liquidity Ratio of liquid assets over total assets +/- 
Deposit/Total assets Total deposits over total assets +/- 
Loans/Total assets Ratio of total loans to total assets +/- 
Share Number of branches in affected and occupied south-eastern regions/Total branches 
 
 Appendix B 
Table B1. Descriptive statistics for multimarket competition in different samples. 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 
Sample of all regions 
 Domestic banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.334 3.508 4.979 3.414 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.134 2.562 3.882 2.511 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.056 0.044 0.053 0.043 
 Multimarket banks 
 City level 
(≥30 branches) 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
MMC weighted by similarity  7.759 5.379 7.353 4.818 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.965 2.975 5.035 2.990 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.123 0.121 0.102 0.086 
Sample of unoccupied regions 
 All banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.436 3.405 5.127 3.320 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.186 2.466 3.987 2.438 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.059 0.044 0.056 0.043 
 Domestic banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  4.944 3.198 4.650 3.140 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   3.833 2.323 3.636 2.305 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.052 0.040 0.049 0.040 
 Multimarket banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.100 3.152 5.907 3.045 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.662 2.291 4.550 2.250 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.066 0.042 0.065 0.041 
 Multimarket banks 
 City level 
(≥30 branches) 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.940 4.532 6.609 4.091 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.534 2.561 4.596 2.577 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.105 0.097 0.088 0.070 
Descriptive statistics for multimarket contacts corresponding to different samples. 
 Table B2. Robustness check – different samples. 
 All banks Domestic banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
Panel A. Sample of all regions 
Panel A1. Regional level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* (0.002) -0.358* (0.194) 0.004** (0.002) 
Size         0.003 (0.011)    0.005 (0.011)    -0.001 (0.016)    
Liquidity    0.035 (0.027)    0.036 (0.027)    0.026 (0.029)    
Equity       -0.036 (0.035)    -0.037 (0.035)    -0.056 (0.040)    
Loans/Total assets 0.022 (0.023)    0.021 (0.023)    0.008 (0.028)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.032* (0.018)    0.040** (0.018)    0.028 (0.020)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,430 4,430 3,710 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
Panel A2. Center city level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* (0.002) -0.369* (0.197) 0.004* (0.002) 
Size         0.003 (0.011)    0.005 (0.011)    -0.001 (0.016)    
Liquidity    0.035 (0.027)    0.036 (0.027)    0.026 (0.029)    
Equity       -0.036 (0.035)    -0.038 (0.035)    -0.056 (0.040)    
Loans/Total assets 0.022 (0.023)    0.021 (0.023)    0.008 (0.028)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* (0.018)    0.040** (0.018)    0.028 (0.020)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,430 4,430 3,710 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
Panel B. Sample of unoccupied regions 
Panel B1. Regional level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* (0.002) -0.369* (0.202) 0.005* (0.003) 
Size         0.003 (0.011)    0.004 (0.011)    -0.001 (0.017)    
Liquidity    0.035 (0.027)    0.036 (0.027)    0.027 (0.029)    
Equity       -0.038 (0.036)    -0.041 (0.036)    -0.058 (0.042)    
Loans/Total assets 0.022 (0.024)    0.021 (0.023)    0.009 (0.028)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* (0.019)    0.039** (0.019)    0.028 (0.021)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,390 4,390 3,670 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
Panel B2. Center city level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* (0.002) -0.385* (0.204) 0.005* (0.002) 
Size         0.003 (0.011)    0.004 (0.011)    -0.001 (0.017)    
Liquidity    0.035 (0.027)    0.036 (0.027)    0.026 (0.029)    
Equity       -0.038 (0.036)    -0.041 (0.036)    -0.059 (0.042)    
Loans/Total assets 0.022 (0.024)    0.021 (0.023)    0.009 (0.028)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* (0.019)    0.039** (0.019)    0.028 (0.021)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,390 4,390 3,670 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
This table reports fixed-effects regressions for samples of all banks and domestic banks. Panels A and B report regressions 
for multimarket competition in all regions and in unoccupied regions, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is 
natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total 
assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total loans to total assets; Deposit is 
ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table B3. Robustness check – different weighting factor. 
 Panel A. Sample of all regions 
             Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition weighted by ratio 
of developed markets 
0.014** (0.006) 0.014** (0.006) 0.009** (0.005) 0.009* (0.004) 
Size         -0.000 (0.012)    0.003 (0.011)    -0.001 (0.012)    -0.001 (0.012)    
Liquidity    0.045 (0.037)    0.035 (0.027)    0.046 (0.036)    0.046 (0.036)    
Equity       -0.042 (0.044)    -0.035 (0.035)    -0.042 (0.043)    -0.042 (0.043)    
Loans/Total assets 0.016 (0.027)    0.021 (0.024)    0.017 (0.027)    0.018 (0.027)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.041* (0.022)    0.033* (0.018)    0.040* (0.022)    0.040* (0.023)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,876 3,764 3,911 3,911 
Adj. R-Square 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.055 
 Panel B. Sample of unoccupied regions 
             Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition weighted by ratio 
of developed markets 
0.015** (0.006) 0.014** (0.007) 0.014** (0.006) 0.014** (0.006) 
Size         0.000 (0.012)    0.001 (0.013)    -0.000 (0.012)    -0.000 (0.012)    
Liquidity    0.040 (0.037)    0.040 (0.038)    0.043 (0.037)    0.043 (0.037)    
Equity       -0.041 (0.045)    -0.040 (0.046)    -0.040 (0.045)    -0.040 (0.045)    
Loans/Total assets 0.011 (0.028)    0.010 (0.028)    0.013 (0.028)    0.013 (0.028)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.040* (0.022)    0.042* (0.023)    0.040* (0.023)    0.040* (0.023)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,829 3,704 3,851 3,851 
Adj. R-Square 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.055 
This table reports fixed-effects regressions for sample of multimarket banks. Multimarket competition in weighted by the 
ratio of developed markets. Panels A and B report multimarket contact in all regions and in unoccupied regions, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. ROA is 
net profit over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity 
is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio of total 
loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 Table B4. Robustness check for differences-in-differences approach 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Test of mean difference for the pre-treatment period 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 Difference 
Parallel trend test of the dependent variable for the pre-treatment period 
ROA   -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 
Mean comparisons for the pre-treatment period 
Size         13.423 14.560 -1.137*** 
Liquidity    0.220 0.145 0.075*** 
Equity       0.289 0.209 0.080*** 
Loans/Total assets 0.615 0.692 -0.077*** 
Deposits/Total assets 0.470 0.495 -0.025*** 
Panel B. Traditional differences-in-differences estimation 
 MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition     0.021* (0.012)    0.021 (0.014)    0.214 (0.927)    
MMC*Treatment*Post -0.005* (0.002)    -0.006** (0.003)    -0.436* (0.229)    
Size         0.069* (0.039)    0.069* (0.038)    0.073* (0.038)    
Liquidity    -0.015 (0.090)    -0.019 (0.089)    -0.026 (0.088)    
Equity       -0.111 (0.154)    -0.113 (0.154)    -0.111 (0.153)    
Loans/Total assets -0.073 (0.124)    -0.072 (0.123)    -0.070 (0.123)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.127 (0.098)    0.128 (0.099)    0.139 (0.100)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect No  No  No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         1,081            1,081            1,081    
Adj. R-Square       0.077          0.077          0.076    
Panel C: The effect of multimarket competition in south-eastern regions on bank performance 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition 0.005* (0.003)    0.013* (0.008)    -0.498 (0.513)    
Size         -0.000 (0.012)    0.005 (0.012)    0.005 (0.012)    
Liquidity    0.044 (0.037)    0.061 (0.051)    0.057 (0.044)    
Equity       -0.042 (0.044)    -0.016 (0.043)    -0.021 (0.041)    
Loans/Total assets 0.018 (0.027)    0.008 (0.034)    0.020 (0.033)    
Deposits/Total assets 0.039* (0.023)    0.057** (0.025)    0.055** (0.022)    
Quarter and year fixed-effects Yes  Yes Yes 
Ownership fixed-effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         3,876            3,204            3,672    
Adj. R-Square       0.054          0.065          0.056    
Panel A reports the test of mean differences of banks’ characteristics between control and treatment groups. Panel B reports 
fixed-effects differences-in-differences regression using traditional binary treatment. Regression is estimated for multimarket 
domestic banks. Panel C reports fixed-effects regression for multimarket banks with reference to multimarket competition in 
south-eastern regions. The constant term is estimated but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; 
Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposit/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loan is ratio 
of total loans to total assets; Deposit is ratio of total deposit to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.
 Appendix C 
Assume that there are 4 banks which operate in 3 markets A, B and C. Each bank has the 
number of branches in each market as follows: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market A 1 0 4 5 
Market B 2 2 0 4 
Market C 3 3 0 6 
We have market share of each bank in each market as follows: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market A 𝑠1𝐴 = 0.1 𝑠2𝐴 = 0 𝑠3𝐴 = 0.4 𝑠4𝐴 = 0.5 
Market B 𝑠1𝐵 = 0.25 𝑠2𝐵 = 0.25 𝑠3𝐵 = 0 𝑠4𝐵 = 0.5 
Market C 𝑠1𝐴 = 0.25 𝑠2𝐶 = 0.25 𝑠3𝐶 = 0 𝑠4𝐶 = 0.5 
MMC1 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑆𝐼12 = |0.25 − 0.25| + |0.25 − 0.25| = 0 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(2 − 0)
2⁄ = 1 
𝑆𝐼13 = |0.1 − 0.4| = 0.3 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(1 − 0.3)
1⁄ = 0.7 
𝑆𝐼14 = |0.1 − 0.5| + |0.25 − 0.5| + |0.25 − 0.5| = 0.9 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(3 − 0.9)
3⁄ = 0.7 
𝑀𝑀𝐶1 =
2 × 1 + 1 × 0.7 + 3 × 0.7
3
= 1.6 
MMC2 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑤212 =
2
3⁄ = 0.667 
𝑤213 =
1
3⁄ = 0.333 
𝑤214 =
3
3⁄ = 1 
𝑀𝑀𝐶2 =
2 × 0.667 + 1 × 0.333 + 3 × 1
3
= 1.556 
MMC3 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑤312 =
(0.25 + 0.25)
2⁄ = 0.25 
𝑤313 =
0.4
1⁄ = 0.4 
𝑤314 =
(0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5)
3⁄ = 0.5 
𝑀𝑀𝐶3 =
2 × 0.25 + 1 × 0.4 + 3 × 0.5
3
= 0.8
 
